Abstract :
This paper uses an analytical framework derived from Pierre
Bourdieu’s sociology to explain the genesis of the European
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Long-term social and institutional
processes at work in the making of ESDP are addressed
through an emphasis on the institutionalization of social fields,
the impact of structural crises, and the socialization of policy
makers into specific schemes of perception and action (habitus).
Two arguments follow from this framework. First, the paper shows
that the creation of ESDP after 1998 would have been impossible
without the prior institutionalization of two transgovernmental
arenas : (1) the European foreign policy field, wherein EU diplomats
vie for influence over EU policies ; and (2) the international defense
field, centered upon military relations within NATO. Second, ESDP
results from the strategies of a number of diplomats and military
leaders who, following the end of the Cold War, perceived that they
faced important organizational crises in their respective fields. This
sociological framework provides a more nuanced account of ESDP’s
creation than that proposed by the two dominant explanations in
international relations theory—realism’s balancing and constructivism’s
strategic culture convergence. Combining structural and ideational factors, it elucidates three empirical puzzles : the lack
of opposition to ESDP when it was launched, the motives of policy
makers who proposed ESDP, and the disappearance of alternative
options for the European security architecture.
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Frédéric 

